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App. The defense is designed to protect “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violated the law.” Malley v. Briggs, The Ninth Circuit thought it “clear” that these cases did not permit Morse’s actions. First Amendment principles. See, e.g., Wood v. Strickland, Cf. 341 (1986) 393 U. S. 503, Neither can I simply say that Morse may have taken the right action (confiscating Frederick’s banner) but for the wrong reason (“drug speech”). 500 U. S. 226, . In addition, plaintiff’s counsel appeared to agree with the Court’s suggestion at oral argument that Frederick “would not pursue” injunctive relief if he prevailed on the damages question. See 439 F. 3d 1114, 1124 (2006). certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit. See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, MORSE et al. Yet no one wishes to substitute courts for school boards, or to turn the judge’s chambers into the principal’s office. 501 U. S. 808, The principle of qualified immunity fits this case perfectly and, by saying so, we would diminish the risk of bringing about the adverse consequences I have identified. . No. v. FREDERICK. 201–202 (2001) None of these cases clearly governs the case at hand. Consequently, larger numbers of those disputes will likely make their way from the schoolhouse to the courthouse. Fraser, supra, nor school sponsored speech, cf. We should decline this opportunity today. Joseph Frederick (P) , a public school student, was suspended by the principal Deborah Morse (D) for displaying a banner on which was written “Bong Hits 4 Jesus”, bong being slang for marijuana, at a school event which was covered by television. First Amendment . v. Barnette, , n. 6 (1975). 420 U. S. 308 Tr. . v. Kuhlmeier, , indicated that school officials could restrict a student’s freedom to give a school assembly speech containing an elaborate sexual metaphor; and Hazelwood School Dist. But in doing so the superintendent noted that several actions independent of Frederick’s speech supported the suspension, including the plaintiff’s disregard of a school official’s instruction, his failure to report to the principal’s office on time, his “defiant [and] disruptive behavior,” and the “belligerent attitude” he displayed when he finally reported. West Virginia Bd. Were we to decide this case on the ground of qualified immunity, our decision would be unanimous, for the dissent concedes that Morse should not be held liable in damages for confiscating Frederick’s banner. In Saucier,the Court wrote that lower courts’ “first inquiry must be whether a constitutional right would have been violated on the facts alleged.” Id., at 200. (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (“We should either make clear that constitutional determinations are not insulated from our re-view … or else drop any pretense at requiring the ordering in every case”); Saucier, supra, at 210 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in judgment) (“The two-part test today’s decision imposes holds large potential to confuse”); Siegert v. Gilley, for Cert. Affirmative. Qualified immunity applies here and entitles Principal Morse to judgment on Frederick’s monetary damages claim because she did not clearly violate the law during her confrontation with the student. Morse v. Frederick, case in which the U.S. Supreme Court on June 25, 2007, ruled (5–4) that Alaskan school officials had not violated a student’s First Amendment freedom of speech rights after suspending him for displaying, at a school event, a banner that was seen as promoting illegal drug use. 1249, 1275 (2006) (calling the requirement “a puzzling misadventure in constitutional dictum”); Dirrane v. Brookline Police Dept., 315 F. 3d 65, 69–70 (CA1 2002) (referring to the requirement as “an uncomfortable exercise” when “the answer whether there was a violation may depend on a kaleidoscope of facts not yet fully developed”); Lyons v. Xenia, 417 F. 3d 565, 580–584 (CA6 2005) (Sutton, J., concurring). During a real war, one less metaphorical than the war on drugs, the Court declined an opportunity to draw narrow subject-matter-based lines. 46–48. 818 (1982) Morse. Resolving the 323 U. S. 101, At the time of that confrontation, Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 06–278. . 347 (1936) In part that is because the question focuses upon specific content narrowly defined: May a school board punish students for speech that advocates drug use and, if so, when? See infra, at 5–8. One concern is that, while the holding is theoretically limited to speech promoting the use of illegal drugs, it could in fact authorize further viewpoint-based restrictions. See, e.g., Guiles ex rel. To say that school officials might reasonably prohibit students during school-related events from unfurling 14-foot banners (with any kind of irrelevant or inappropriate message) designed to attract attention from television cameras seems unlikely to undermine basic (Breyer, J., concurring). First Amendment issue on the merits. That is because, in the Ninth Circuit’s view, this case involved neither lewd speech, cf. 46–48. Do school officials have the authority to restrict student speech that they perceive as harmful to other students? See, e.g., Payne v. Tennessee, 513 (1969) 1. Synopsis of Rule of Law. What about deprecating commentary about an antidrug film shown in school? It is utterly unnecessary to do so. Saucier does not bind this Court. How to turn your presentation into a video with Prezi Video; July 31, 2020. This last point warrants amplification. Post, at 1 (opinion of Stevens, J.). And the “cardinal principle of judicial restraint” is that “if it is not necessary to decide more, it is necessary not to decide more.” PDK Labs., Inc. v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 362 F. 3d 786, 799 (CADC 2004) (Roberts, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). Those principles do not permit treating “drug use” separately without a satisfying explanation of why drug use is sui generis. The upshot is that the school board’s refusal to erase the suspension from the record may well be justified on non-speech-related grounds. Only if there is a constitutional violation, can lower courts proceed to consider whether the official is entitled to “qualified immunity.” See ibid.

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